It is often objected that philosophers are caught up in the impossiblly fruitless task of discovering truths about the world. In many respects, I am inclined to agree. But then we also need to concede that scientists are engaged in the same fruitless project. Yet no one is prepared to go this far. Why, however, should we prioritise observation over a priori analysis? It is by no means clear to me.

Here is one reason to think otherwise: your eyes can deceive you.

My own thought is that science is seen as a reliable way of getting at truths because its findings have explicit pragmatic consequences. But this is to say nothing about truth. That 2 + 2 = 4 is true, but pragmatically worthless. An uninformative identity is of no help to anyone. In contrast, that phlogiston had such-and-such qualities was pragmatically helpful to 18th century chemists. But this was patently false. So pragmatic worth cannot be be the sole criterion of truth.

There has to be something more. Sociological reasons. Science has been professionalised. It is a powerful institution, and that is why it tells us true things.

(I do not mean to sound so heretical. But science makes me sick at times. I have worked in labs; I know the scientific method. But, still, I cringe at the thought of people thinking that that method is the only means by which we determine true things.)